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JOHN SELLARS  
 
Philosophy during the Renaissance adopted a range of different literary forms. One 
that proved popular was the work of consolation, inspired by ancient models such 
as the consolatory works of Seneca. Many of these works were prompted by 
immediate, often traumatic events – both personal and political – and were 
sincere attempts to draw on ancient models of consolatory thought for the 
therapeutic benefit they might confer. In this chapter I shall examine examples of 
philosophical consolation by Petrarch, Filelfo, and Scala among others, 
approaching them as practical responses to the vicissitudes of fate and fortune. In 
particular I shall focus on the way these authors draw on ancient therapeutic 
arguments recorded in Cicero and Seneca, such as the Stoic denial that external 
events are ever truly bad. I shall also be concerned with what these Renaissance 
works tells us about how their authors conceived the role and purpose of 
philosophy – a practical guide to life.  
 
1. Ancient Background  
 
Philosophy during the Renaissance adopted a variety of literary forms. One of 
these was the philosophical consolation, which itself found expression in a 
variety of different kinds of text, from letters to friends, works of self-consolation, 
and dialogues. In this variety it followed ancient precedents, drawing on both 
new discoveries and texts already well known. In the beginning, the Renaissance 
consolatory tradition leaned heavily on the works of Cicero and Seneca, both 
readily available and already well known. In the case of Cicero, the Tusculanae 
disputationes was a key point of reference, acting as a sourcebook for consolatory 
and therapeutic material from the Greek philosophical schools. In particular we 
might note Cicero’s references to a now-lost work of the Academic philosopher 
Crantor, which may have been one of the first literary works of philosophical 
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consolation.1 Another lost work to which Cicero refers is his own Consolatio, 
written in response to the loss of his daughter Tullia, who had died a few weeks 
after childbirth in 45 BC.2 Cicero’s response to this loss was to seek out 
consolatory literature, such as Crantor’s On Grief, and to write his own text of self-
consolation.3 In a letter to his friend Atticus he wrote,  
 
Nothing has been written by any author on the alleviation of grief 
which I did not read in your house. But my sorrow is stronger than 
any consolation. I have even done something which I imagine no one 
has ever done before, consoled myself in a literary composition.4  
 
	
1 See Cicero, Tusc. 1.115 (referring to the Consolatione Crantoris), 3.12 (recording Crantor’s 
disagreement with the Stoic docrine of ἀπάθεια), and 3.71 (reporting Crantor’s view that one ought 
to yield to grief); note also Acad. 2.135. The fragments for Crantor’s On Grief (Περὶ πένθους) are 
gathered together in H. J. Mette, “Zwei Akademiker heute: Krantor von Soloi und Arkesilaos von 
Pitane,” Lustrum 26 (1984): 7-94, at 16-23; they are discussed in Margaret Graver, Cicero on the 
Emotions: Tusculan Disputations 3 and 4 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 187-94. See 
also John Dillon, The Heirs of Plato: A Study of the Old Academy (347-274 BC) (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 2003), 216-31, esp. 224-30.  
2 Cicero refers to his own Consolatio at Tusc. 1.65-6, 1.76, and 4.63. On the death of Tullia, see 
Graver, Cicero on the Emotions, xiii. The fragments for the Consolatio are gathered together in 
Claudius Vitelli, M. Tulli Ciceronis Consolationis Fragmenta ([Milan:] Mondadori, 1979); note also 
the older collection in C. F. W. Mueller, M. Tulli Ciceronis Scripta Quae Manserunt Omnia, Partis 
IV, Vol. III (Leipzig: Teubner, 1904), 332-8. A work purporting to be Cicero’s Consolatio was 
published in 1583, although this was a modern forgery; see further William McCuaig, Carlo Sigonio: 
The Changing World of the Late Renaissance (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 291-236.  
3 Pliny, Hist. Nat. Praef. 22, reports that Cicero acknowledged in the Consolatio that he was 
following Crantor’s work.  
4 Cicero, Att. 12.14.3 (251 Shackleton Bailey): Nihil enim de maerore minuendo scriptum ab ullo est 
quod ego non domi tuae legerim. Sed omnem consolationem vincit dolor. Quin etiam feci, quod 
profecto ante me nemo, ut ipse me per litteras consolarer.  
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Alas, readers in the Renaissance were deprived access to this text, save for a 
handful of fragments preserved by Lactantius, Pliny, and, of course, Cicero 
himself.5  
 
With Seneca we have extant works of consolation addressed to others – Marcia, 
Polybius, his mother Helvia – dealing with bereavement and exile, as well as 
letters with consolatory intent in his Epistulae ad Lucilium.6 The Consolatio ad 
Marciam is the earliest work of consolation to survive intact. To these we can add 
a number of other ancient works, such as the Consolatio ad Apollonium, attributed 
to Plutarch but often thought to be spurious; this text also owes a debt to Crantor.7 
In late antiquity we find Boethius’ Consolatione philosophiae, along with echoes 
of the ancient tradition in a wide variety of early Christian writers. Ancient texts 
such as these offered both examples of forms of consolatory writing and reports 
of arguments from the ancient schools that were supposed to console those facing 
the vicissitudes of fate and fortune.8  
 
	
5 They could, however, read a letter of consolation that Cicero received in response to his 
daughter’s death from Servius Sulpicius Rufus (Fam. 4.5 (248 Shackleton Bailey)). This letter was 
preserved in a manuscript of Fam. found in Milan in 1392 and copied for Coluccio Salutati. Both 
the original and the copy were in Florence by 1406, and have remained there ever since (now Laur. 
49.9 and 49.7). See further L. D. Reynolds, ed., Texts and Transmission: A Survey of the Latin Classics 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 138-9.  
6 See, for example, Seneca, Ep. 63 and 99.  
7 See [Plut.] Cons. ad Apoll. 102d, 104c, and 114c. Note also Plutarch’s consolation to his wife, the 
Consolatio ad uxorem, written after the death of their two-year-old daughter.  
8 For further discussion of the ancient consolatory tradition, see the papers in Han Baltussen, ed., 
Greek and Roman Consolations: Eight Studies of a Tradition and its Afterlife (Swansea: The Classical 
Press of Wales, 2013), which includes chapters on Cicero’s Consolatio, Seneca, and Pseudo-
Plutarch, among others. The classic study of the topic is Rudolf Kassel, Untersuchungen zur 
griechischen und römischen Konsolationsliteratur, Zetemata 18 (Munich: Beck, 1958).  
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Not all works of consolation, however, are philosophical. By ‘philosophical 
consolation’ one ought to understand an attempt to offer a remedy for some kind 
of perceived misfortune – bereavement, loss of property or reputation, exile – 
with reference to philosophical argument. These might be i) arguments 
questioning the value of the thing lost (and so the appropriateness of the feeling 
of misfortune), ii) arguments about the appropriateness of emotional responses 
in general, or iii) arguments about the necessity or inevitability of the perceived 
misfortune. Some of these will draw on aspects of ethical theory while others 
might involve reference to natural philosophy. The various ancient schools 
offered arguments of all three types, with the Stoics being most forthright in their 
rejection of any kind of negative response to a perceived misfortune, arguing that 
i) external things are at best merely preferable but not good, and certainly not 
essential for a good life; ii) all negative emotional responses are inappropriate, 
being grounded on mistaken judgements; and iii) whatever happens does so of 
necessity and, indeed, is due to the providential ordering of Nature created by the 
divine reason that permeates all things.9 Other schools disputed these claims, and 
Cicero’s Tusculanae disputationes records many of the ancient debates:  
 
Some hold that the comforter has only one responsibility: to teach 
the sufferer that what happened is not an evil at all. This is the view 
of Cleanthes. Others, including the Peripatetics, would teach that it 
is not a great evil. Still others, for instance Epicurus, would draw 
attention away from evils and towards good things, and there are yet 
others who think it sufficient to show that nothing has happened 
	
9 These Stoic doctrines could be found within texts readily accessible throughout the Renaissance; 
see e.g. Cicero, Fin. 3.29, Tusc. 4.11-33, and Seneca, Ep. 107.11 respectively.  
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contrary to expectation. And the list goes on. Chrysippus, for his part, 
holds that the key to consolation is to get rid of the person’s belief 
that mourning is something he ought to do, something just and 
appropriate.10  
 
Cicero goes on to say that in his own Consolatio he brought together all these 
different methods, in a desperate search for any kind of relief from his sorrow. 
One of the defining characteristics of philosophical consolation is the idea that 
the person in a state of distress has made a mistake – either they have overly 
valued some external thing, they wish things to be other than they must 
necessarily be, or they are behaving contrary to human nature. These are errors 
that ought to be corrected for their own sakes, and not merely in order to reduce 
an individual’s suffering. One of the functions of philosophical consolation, then, 
is to show that an error has been made, and that the distress being suffered is due 
to this error of judgement rather than anything that has taken place in the 
external world.  
 
In what follows we shall consider a number of Renaissance attempts at 
philosophical consolation, all of which draw heavily on this ancient tradition. 
From Petrarch to Ficino, we shall see a variety of Cynic, Stoic, Platonic, and 
Aristotelian ideas taken up and put to work in the service of relieving suffering at 
	
10 Cicero, Tusc. 3.76: Sunt qui unum officium consolantis putent malum illud omnino non esse, ut 
Cleanthi placet; sunt qui non magnum malum, ut Peripatetici; sunt qui abducant a malis ad bona, ut 
Epicurus; sunt qui satis putent estendere nihil inopinati accidisse nihil non alii. Chrysippus aut caput 
esse censet in consolando detrahere illam opinionem maerenti, se officio fungi putet iusto atque 
debito. I quote from the translation in Graver, Cicero on the Emotions, 33-4, and the Latin text 
printed here reflects her emendation of Pohlenz’s text.  
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the hands 0f fate.11 That these Humanists and philosophers considered 
consolation to be an important task for philosophy also tells us something about 
how they conceived philosophy as an activity.  
 
2. Francesco Petrarch  
 
Following the ancient tradition, Francesco Petrarch wrote a number of letters of 
consolation to friends during times of distress.12 He also engaged in self-
consolation, following the precedent set by Cicero. We can see this in his dialogue 
Secretum, in which ‘Franciscus’ (standing for Petrarch himself) confesses his 
sufferings while ‘Augustinus’ (modelled on St Augustine) offers therapeutic 
arguments in reply.13 In particular he recommends to Franciscus texts by Seneca 
and Cicero:  
 
	
11 Inevitably this will not be a comprehensive survey. A number of relevant texts have been passed 
over in silence, while the ones discussed are done so only selectively. Among works not discussed 
here, one might note Giannozzo Manetti’s Dialogus Consolatorius of 1438, which is addressed in 
Alfonso De Petris, “Giannozzo Manetti and his Consolatoria,” Bibliothèque d’Humanisme et 
Renaissance 41 (1979): 493-525, and Leon Battista Alberti’s Theogenius, discussed in Timothy 
Kircher, Living Well in Renaissance Italy: The Virtues of Humanism and the Irony of Leon Battista 
Alberti (Tempe, AZ: ACMRS, 2012), esp. 134-64. For a fuller discussion of consolation in the 
Renaissance, see George W. McClure, Sorrow and Consolation in Italian Humanism (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1991).  
12 Petrarch’s consolatory letters include Rerum familiarium libri 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.8, 3.16, 4.12, 6.3, 
7.13, 8.1, 11.2, 13.1, 14.3, 18.15, 21.9, 23.12. There is a critical edition in Francesco Petrarch, Le Familiari, 
ed. Vittorio Rossi and Umberto Bosco, 4 vols (Florence: Sansoni, 1933-42); they can also be found 
in Francesco Petrarch, Opera quae extant Omnia (Basel: Heinrich Petri, 1554), 631-779. They are 
translated in Francesco Petrarch, Letters on Familiar Matters, trans. Aldo S. Bernardo, 3 vols (New 
York: Italica Press, [1975-85] 2005). For discussion see George W. McClure, Sorrow and 
Consolation, 30-45.  
13 Petrarch’s Secretum is edited and translated in Francesco Petrarch, My Secret Book, ed. and trans. 
Nicholas Mann (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016). For a discussion of it as a work 
of consolation see McClure, Sorrow and Consolation, 18-29.  
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If ever the inner turmoil of your mind were to cease, this uproar all 
around you, believe me, would strike your senses but wouldn’t 
disturb your mind. I don’t want to fill your ears with things that you 
already know, but there is a useful letter by Seneca on this topic, and 
there’s his book De tranquillitate animi; and then there’s that 
excellent book written by Cicero for Brutus on the basis of the third 
day of the discussions on his Tusculan estate, on how this sickness of 
the soul can be completely eliminated.14  
 
Far more significant, though, was his De remediis utriusque fortunae, a substantial 
work taking the form of a series of dialogues, devoted to the topic of how to deal 
with fortune, both good and bad.15 It was composed in the 1350s and 1360s and 
drew heavily on Cicero’s Tusculanae disputationes, while also taking inspiration 
from Pseudo-Seneca’s De remediis fortuitorum. Although presented in dialogue 
form, the work is not a series of conversations between characters but instead a 
	
14 Petrarch, Secretum 2.15.9: Quod si unquam intestinus tumultus tue mentis conquiesceret, fragor 
iste circumtonans, michi crede, sensus quidem pulsaret, sed animum non moveret. Ac ne nota pridem 
auribus tuis ingeram, habes Senece de hac re non inutilem epystolam, habes et librum eiusdem De 
Tranquillitate animi; habes et de tota hac mentis egritudine tollenda librum M. Ciceronis egregium, 
quem ex tertie diei disputationibus in Tusculano suo habitis ad Brutum scrpsit. On Petrarch’s 
admiration for both Cicero and Seneca, see B. L. Ullman, Studies in the Italian Renaissance, 2nd 
edn (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1973), 119-21, who notes that Petrarch cites Cicero’s 
Tusculanae disputationes “more often than any other philosophical work”.  
15 See Francesco Petrarch, Les remèdes aux deux fortunes / De remediis utriusque fortune, ed. and 
trans. Christophe Carraud, 2 vols (Grenoble: Éditions Jérôme Millon, 2002); the text can also be 
found in Opera Omnia, 1-254. There is an annotated English translation in Francesco Petrarch, 
Remedies for Fortune Fair and Foul, trans. Conrad H. Rawski, 5 vols (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1991). For discussions see McClure, Sorrow and Consolation, 46-72; Letizia 
Panizza, “Stoic Psychotherapy in the Middle Ages and Renaissance: Petrarch’s De remediis,” in 
Atoms, Pneuma, and Tranquillity: Epicurean and Stoic Themes in European Thought, ed. M. J. Osler 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 39-65; Timothy Kircher, “On the Two Faces of 
Fortune,” in Petrarch: A Critical Guide to the Complete Works, ed. Victoria Kirkham and Armando 
Maggi (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 245-53.  
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back-and-forth between “Reason” (Ratio) and the emotions of “Joy” (Gaudium), 
“Hope” (Spes), “Sorrow” (Dolor), and “Fear” (Metus). In Book 1, Reason debates 
with Joy and Hope, while in Book 2 Reason takes on Sorrow and Fear. These four 
types of emotion are the canonical negative emotions in Stoicism, which were 
discussed at length by Cicero in the Tusculanae disputationes.16 All four emotions 
are the product of fortune: Joy and Hope come about in times of prosperity while 
Sorrow and Fear accompany adversity. The central thesis of the work as a whole 
is that people need remedies for both kinds of fortune, good and bad, as the title 
indicates. In this Petrarch takes up a theme one can find in Seneca’s De 
providentia, in which the Stoic argued that “the greatest danger comes from 
excessive good fortune”.17 The danger with good fortune is twofold: it makes one 
weak and lazy, untested by the challenges of adversity, and it makes it harder to 
deal with adversity when it finally comes, as it inevitably will.  
 
Between them, the two books of De remediis contain over two hundred and fifty 
short dialogues between reason and the four emotions; it will only be possible to 
discuss a handful here. The most explicitly consolatory exchanges are in Book 2, 
between Reason and Sorrow. In 2.9, entitled De damno, Reason responds to the 
complaints of Sorrow against Fortune. It is a mistake to think that Fortune can 
rob one of anything, for all Fortune does is take back what is already hers. This 
echoes the Stoic claim that whatever someone has is merely on loan and must 
eventually be returned.18 Fortune is powerless to take away the essentials of life, 
	
16 See esp. Cicero, Tusc. 3.24-5. Note, however, some terminological variation: in Cicero the four 
emotions are delight (laetitia), lust (libido), distress (aegritudo), and fear (metus).  
17 Seneca, Prov. 4.10: periculosissima felicitatis intemperantia est. Note also, on two kinds of fortune, 
Seneca, Ep. 76.21.  
18 See e.g. Seneca, Cons. Marc. 10.1, Cons. Polyb. 10.4-5, and Tranq. 11.2-3. Note also Epictetus, Ench. 
11, although Petrarch is unlikely to have had access to this.  
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for what is most essential is virtue, which is outside of her control. While some 
basic physical necessities persist, poverty is often a matter of perspective, and 
“once you have attained virtue you do not feel poverty any longer”.19 True riches 
reside in a noble mind. The contrast throughout is between external goods and 
virtue, and the mistaken way in which people attribute value to the former over 
the latter: “Virtue is not attained through riches, but riches are attained through 
virtue. Virtue is the best defence against any kind of fortune, and against poverty 
as well”.20 In response to the problem of exile later in the text, Petrarch turns to 
Socrates for counsel who, when asked where he was born, replied that he was a 
citizen of the whole world (mundus).21 Only the small-minded are so attached to 
one part of the world that they consider themselves exiled when they are 
anywhere else. In both cases broadly Stoic doctrine is put to work for therapeutic 
ends.  
 
The dangers of good fortune are equally important to address. When, in Book 1, 
Joy proclaims the benefits of possessing wealth, Reason warns of the envy, danger, 
and burdens that come with it.22 Friends can no longer be trusted. What has been 
fought hard to acquire will require further work to retain, and will generate 
suffering when eventually lost. It is easy to think that great wealth will bring peace 
of mind, but in fact, Reason suggests, those in honest poverty are often much 
	
19 Petrarch, De remediis 2.9 (Opera Omnia, 134; Les remèdes, 594): Semel vero ubi ad illam perveneris, 
non senties paupertatem.  
20 Petrarch, De remediis 2.9 (Opera Omnia, 135; Les remèdes, 594): non divitiis virtus, sed virtute 
divitie queruntur. Virtus una contra fortunam omnem, contraque pauperiem ars optima. (I quote 
the text in Les remèdes, which differs at a number of points from that printed in the Opera Omnia.) 
21 See Cicero, Tusc. 5.108, cited in Petrarch, De remediis 2.67 (Opera Omnia, 183; Les remèdes, 828).  
22 This is Petrarch, De remediis 1.53 (Opera Omnia, 64-5; Les remèdes, 264).  
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happier.23 While those experiencing good fortune might not require consolation, 
they nevertheless still need philosophical therapy for their misplaced 
satisfaction. For Petrarch, then, philosophical consolation focused on attending 
to ascriptions of value, explicitly drawing on ancient Stoicism.   
 
3. Coluccio Salutati  
 
As we have seen, Petrarch’s consolations for fortune were based on a broadly 
Stoic worldview. Coluccio Salutati – for many years Chancellor of Florence – 
shared that worldview, embracing a variety of Stoic ideas,24 albeit qualified in the 
light of some aspects of Christian doctrine.25 However, when put to the test, 
Salutati found Stoicism wanting as the foundation for real consolation.  
 
The test came relatively late in life when, in 1400, Salutati’s son died. His friend 
and correspondent Francesco Zabarella sent a letter of consolation drawing on 
the Stoic ideas that Salutati had openly expressed. But in the midst of 
bereavement Salutati found these ideas unconvincing, if not insensitive, and 
wrote a lengthy reply to Zabarella’s letter.26 In the letter Salutati challenged the 
	
23 See Petrarch, De remediis 1.53 (Opera Omnia, 64-5; Les remèdes, 264): vix divitem invenias, qui 
non sibi melius fuisse in mediocritate vel honesta etiam paupertate fateatur. 
24 See, for example, Coluccio Salutati, De Laboribus Herculis, ed. B. L. Ullman, 2 vols (Zürich: 
Thesaurus Mundi, 1951), 1:311. For further discussion see Berthold L. Ullman, The Humanism of 
Coluccio Salutati (Padua: Editrice Antenore, 1963), 21-6, and Ronald G. Witt, Hercules at the 
Crossroads: The Life, Works, and Thought of Coluccio Salutati (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
1983), 62-73.  
25 For example, he denied that one’s happiness could ever be completely within one’s control, for 
it required not just virtue but also the grace of God; see Salutati, Epistulae (Ep.) 2.18, in Coluccio 
Salutati, Epistolario, ed. Francesco Novati, 4 vols (Rome: Forzani, 1891-1911), 1:110.  
26 Salutati’s reply is Ep. 12.4 (Epistolario, 3:456-79). It has been translated into English by Ronald G. 
Witt in Jill Kraye, ed., Cambridge Translations of Renaissance Philosophical Texts, Volume 1: Moral 
Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 179-91, and is discussed in McClure, 
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Stoic claim that death is not an evil. While accepting that, morally, death is 
neither good nor evil, he nevertheless insisted that, naturally, it is an evil insofar 
as it is a privation of the goodness of life.27 Drawing on Aristotle, Salutati argued 
that things we fear are evils, we fear death, so death is an evil.28 This, he suggested, 
is a plainly evident fact, to be contrasted with the “cold-heartedness and 
unattainable logic of the Stoics” that expects “acts and virtues which are 
impossible to find in the weak flesh of mortal men”.29  
 
Death, then, is a privation and, as such, a genuine evil. Consequently it is “a 
legitimate source of sorrow”.30 Although death might be inevitable, Salutati insists 
that reflection on this fact can in no way function as a form of consolation. The 
general fact of mortality does not, he suggests, alter the legitimacy of sorrow in 
individual cases. Indeed, Salutati goes on to challenge not just Stoic claims but 
the very idea of philosophical consolation itself. No rational argument can undo 
the emotion of grief, or for that matter any other emotion: “whatever philosophy 
promises with its lessons on consolation, these [emotions] are not removed, but 
are instead relieved by the passage of time”.31 In any case, someone in the grip of 
	
Sorrow and Consolation, 97-8. This letter was in fact Salutati’s second letter in reply to Zabarella. 
On the first – Ep. 11.23 (Epistolario 3:408-22) – see McClure, Sorrow and Consolation, 95-7.  
27 Ep. 12.4 (Epistolario 3:461; Kraye, Cambridge Translations, 181).  
28 Ep. 12.4 (Epistolario 3:463; Kraye, Cambridge Translations, 182), citing Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 3.6, 
1115a7-11.  
29 Ep. 12.4 (Epistolario 3:463; Kraye, Cambridge Translations, 182): duricies et inaccessibilis ratio 
Stoicorum [preceded by] actusque virtutum qualis et quales in hac carne fragilitateque mortalium 
sit impossibile reperiri.  
30 Ep. 12.4 (Epistolario 3:465; Kraye, Cambridge Translations, 183): mortem nedum esse malum, sed 
dolendam. 
31 Ep. 12.4 (Epistolario 3:470-1; Kraye, Cambridge Translations, 185): quicquid promittat philosophia 
preceptis illis consolandi, non tollitur, sed tempore vel alia potius ratione sedatur. 
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a severe emotion cannot be reasoned with, and on this the Stoics would agree.32 
So philosophy can offer nothing to someone in a state of sorrow. Although the 
Stoics claim to be able to offer therapy for the emotions after someone had 
calmed down, Salutati claims that this is disingenuous: it is the passing of time 
that does the work.33 Grief is simply a process one has to go through.  
 
Salutati, then, was sceptical about the value of philosophical consolation in the 
face of bad fortune. The ideas he had admired for much of his life failed him when 
put to the test. Or perhaps he failed them. His case shows the way in which these 
ancient ideas were not of merely academic or literary interest. They were being 
put to the test in the most challenging of circumstances. As Seneca had said, it is 
one thing to offer consolation to others in grief, but it is quite another to console 
oneself in the face of bereavement.34 Despite Salutati’s claim to have shown the 
limits of philosophical consolation, it remained a topic of widespread interest 
among subsequent Humanists in the Quattrocento.  
 
4. Poggio Bracciolini  
 
One of those Humanists was Poggio Bracciolini, a protégé of Salutati who, like 
him, would go on to become Chancellor of Florence. Towards the end of his life 
he wrote De miseria humanae conditionis, prompted by the fall of Constantinople 
	
32 See Origen, Contra Celsum 8.51, reporting Chrysippus, with discussion in John Sellars, Hellenistic 
Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 189-91.  
33 See Ep. 12.4 (Epistolario 3:477; Kraye, Cambridge Translations, 188-9): virtus est temporis, non vis 
et efficacia consolantis philosophice rationis.  
34 See Seneca, Prov. 4.5.  
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in 1453.35 The text is a dialogue between Poggio, the Humanist Matteo Palmieri, 
and Cosimo de’ Medici. It too engaged with the ancient consolatory literature, 
drawing on Seneca who is described as the “arbiter of morals” (morum 
praeceptor).36 The opening dedication is emphatic that all human misery is due 
to desires for the gifts of fortune. Given that fortune is by nature fickle and 
uncertain, the only way to escape human misery is by reining in those desires. 
Whether fortune is bad or good, human suffering follows: the wealthy live in fear 
of losing their riches; the powerful fear their political opponents. No one is 
content. Unlike his mentor Salutati, though, Poggio suggests that philosophical 
consolation might indeed be able to help:  
 
We should therefore think of those who try to root out these 
excessive desires from our minds, and teach us to have as little as 
possible to do with fortune’s gifts, as making the greatest 
contribution to the two things which, rightly viewed, are to be 
preferred to all others: bodily peace and tranquillity of mind.37  
 
According to Poggio, then, the pursuit of external goods inevitably leads to 
misery, whether one attains them or not. Moreover, placing one’s happiness in 
	
35 The text of De miseria humanae conditionis is in Poggio Bracciolini, Opera (Basel: Heinrich Petri, 
1538), 86-131; there is a facsimile reprint in vol. 1 of Opera Omnia, ed. R. Fubini, 4 vols (Turin: 
Bottega d’Erasmo, 1964-69). Extracts are translated by Martin Davies, in Kraye, Cambridge 
Translations, 17-28. For discussion see Riccardo Fubini, Humanism and Secularization: From 
Petrarch to Valla (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003), 89-139.  
36 Bracciolini, De miseria Book 1 (Opera, 92; Kraye, Cambridge Translations, 23).  
37 Bracciolini, De miseria Praef. (Opera, 87; Kraye, Cambridge Translations, 19): Quapropter qui 
harum rerum nimias cupiditates ex mentibus hominum delere conantur, suadentque parum 
commercii cum fortunae donis habendum esse, pre ceteris consulere iudicandi sunt, tum quieti 
corporis tum animi tranquillitati, quae duo, si sana mens foret, essent caeteris anteferenda. 
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the hands of fortune – which the pursuit of external goods does – is to place it 
under the control of an arbitrary and unreliable power.  
 
In the dialogue that ensues, Cosimo opens by suggesting that the worst excesses 
of bad fortune are offset by the good things that fortune also brings. The person 
suffering from illness, for instance, can take comfort in their family. Reason can 
help people to put into context any immediate suffering so as not to be 
overwhelmed by it. But of course few people develop their reason adequately and 
consequently remain subject to emotions provoked by random acts of fortune. 
To this Poggio responds by saying that such a view is easy for someone like 
Cosimo to maintain, given that his life has been excessively blessed. Drawing on 
a series of Stoic claims, Poggio says that given how rare perfect rationality is, the 
vast majority of the human race is effectively condemned to wretchedness.38 
Moreover, what external goods they do have are only ever on loan, and fortune 
can reclaim them at any moment.39 External goods can bring so much misery in 
their wake that it is perhaps a mistake to call them ‘goods’ at all.  
 
Cosimo’s response to this is to deny that all human beings have been wretched. 
There have been exceptions. The people he has in mind are the great names of 
antiquity and in particular “Socrates and Plato and all those other eminent 
thinkers who ignored the gifts of fortune and gave themselves over to the study 
of philosophy”.40 The misery of the human condition is not inevitable; philosophy 
	
38 Bracciolini, De miseria Book 1 (Opera, 92-3; Kraye, Cambridge Translations, 24).  
39 This is a Stoic theme; see n. 18 above.  
40 Bracciolini, De miseria Book 1 (Opera, 95; Kraye, Cambridge Translations, 26): Socratem quoque 
ac Platonem, ceterosque egregios philosophos, qui relictis fortunae donis se philosophandi studio 
dediderunt. 
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offers a cure. It is only by pursuing so-called external goods – the goods of fortune 
– that people expose themselves to misery. But there is an alternative, namely a 
philosophical life devoted instead to the pursuit of virtue. As in the case of 
Petrarch, it is by attending to ascriptions of value that such suffering can be 
overcome.  
 
5. Francesco Filelfo  
 
In Poggio’s dialogue, Cosimo de’ Medici is presented as a champion of 
philosophical consolation. In the work of Francesco Filelfo, he is given a quite 
different persona. Filelfo’s Commentationes Florentinae de exilio – set in the 1430s 
but written in the early 1440s – offers a philosophical consolation not just for 
exile, as suggested by the title, but also infamy (infamia) and poverty 
(paupertate), with a book devoted to each topic.41 Indeed, at one point Filelfo 
intended to add further topics in additional books, but these were never written.42 
It opens by stating explicitly that one of the functions of philosophy is to provide 
“consolation and relief for adverse and troublesome” circumstances.43 The way it 
can do this is by championing “the goods of the mind” (animi bonis), which are 
stable and reliable, over external goods, which are subject to the “fragility and 
irrationality of fortune” (fragilitate amentiaque fortunae).44  
 
	
41 The text, along with a translation, is in Francesco Filelfo, On Exile, ed. Jeroen De Keyser, trans. 
W. Scott Blanchard (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013).  
42 This is according to an annotation in a manuscript, reported in Filelfo, On Exile, x. In what 
follows I shall focus attention on just the first book, dealing with exile.  
43 Filelfo, De exilio 1.1: adversas atque afflictas consolari levareque consuevit.  
44 De exilio 1.4.  
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The context of the text was the imminent exile of a number of opponents of 
Cosimo de’ Medici, including Palla Strozzi and Rinaldo degli Albizzi, who both 
appear as characters in the dialogue. (Poggio Bracciolini and Giannozzo Manetti 
also make an appearance, joined later by Leonardo Bruni.) Unlike many other 
Humanists in Florence at the time, Filelfo aligned himself with the political 
enemies of the Medici, and the dialogue opens with swipes aimed at “that 
deceiver, poisoner, and blasphemer” Cosimo.45  
 
The discussion in Book 1 is primarily between Palla Strozzi and his son Onofrio, 
who sees exile as a severe misfortune, involving a loss of both freedom and 
reputation. Having abandoned himself to his emotions, Onofrio is no longer able 
to think rationally about his situation. What he needs, his father declares, is 
philosophical training.46 With this as the task, Palla draws on a wide range of 
ancient philosophers in the ensuing discussion. The first is Socrates, and Filelfo 
translates at length from Dio Chrysostom.47 People waste time in pointless 
activities but do not attend to the care of their souls. The soul has two parts – 
rational and irrational – and both require attention. The irrational part here is not 
a Platonic faculty of emotion but rather an Aristotelian nutritive capacity.48 The 
lower, nutritive soul concerns itself with “the mutability and filth of time and the 
body”, while the higher, rational soul reaches towards what is unchanging and 
divine.49 Palla goes on to define emotion (perturbatio) as a movement that sets 
	
45 De exilio 1.11: circunscriptor, veneficus, sacrilegus.   
46 See De exilio 1.22-3.  
47 For example, De exilio 1.24-33 is translated from Dio Chrysostom 13.16-26.  
48 Having said that, Palla also alludes to the Phaedrean image of irrational horses controlled by 
reason (De exilio 1.36).  
49 De exilio 1.50: corporis et temporis mutabilitati ac loeto.  
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people in opposition to their judgement, a definition that he attributes to 
Aristotle. He combines this with the views of Andronicus and the Stoic Zeno that 
an emotion is an irrational judgement and an irrational movement of the soul.50  
 
These fairly basic philosophical distinctions are merely preliminaries to the main 
argument. Their aim is to insist on a division between the rational soul, on the 
one hand, and the nutritive soul and the body on the other. While the rational 
soul is within our power (in nostra potestate), the body, along with all external 
things, is subject to the whims of fortune. The sage, focused exclusively on the 
rational soul, is perfectly free: “nothing can obstruct him, nothing can get in his 
way”.51 Rather than fear fortune, the sage “considers the power and force of 
fortune as a sort of training ground for his own virtue”.52 Consequently, he does 
not endure suffering, but welcomes it.53 Here we see echoes – whether deliberate 
or not – of arguments set out in Seneca’s De providentia. However, the central 
figure in the philosophical consolation that slowly develops during the course of 
the dialogue is not Platonic, Aristotelian, or Stoic, but instead Cynic. It is Diogenes 
the Dog (Diogenes Cyon) who is presented as the ultimate role model, someone 
who “assigned all the beauty, splendor, and elegance of wealth to the goodness 
and excellence of the soul. He thought everything else truly superfluous and at 
odds with virtue.”54 Filelfo has Palla quote translations from the ancient letters 
	
50 See De exilio 1.42-3.  
51 De exilio 1.73-4: nihil eum impedire queat, nihil prohibere.  
52 De exilio 1.76: habet vim impetumque fortunae quasi gymnasium aliquod ac palaestram virtutis 
suae.  
53 See De exilio 1.80.  
54 De exilio 1.90: quippe qui omne divitiarum decus, omnem splendorem, omnem elegantiam in animi 
praestantia bonitateque posuerat. Reliqua vero omnia supervacanea quaedam et inimica virtuti 
iudicabat.  
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attributed to Diogenes,55 which repeat the well-known Cynic praise of poverty. 
Going well beyond the Stoic claim that wealth and external circumstances are 
not necessary for a good life, Palla argues, following Diogenes, that they are in fact 
hindrances to it. Bearing in mind the opening attacks on Cosimo de’ Medici, 
wealth and virtue are presented as mutually exclusive:  
 
Virtue by itself is sufficiently fortified to secure happiness. It is 
sufficiently armed against fortune’s every blow and disaster. It lacks 
no resource, requires no assistance.56  
 
In reply, Onofrio asks whether wealth ought to be considered a fault, if someone 
possessed both virtue and riches.57 While Palla is prepared to concede the formal 
point, he nevertheless insists on complete indifference towards external goods. 
Riches in the hands of someone without virtue are always dangerous and so 
better avoided. (Cosimo’s wealth, it is implied, is the source of his moral 
corruption.) If someone who is virtuous is also wealthy, it will make no difference. 
In any case, no one who already possesses virtue will actively pursue riches, for 
they will know that wealth will bring no further benefits. If, by chance, they 
acquire money, that ought not to be forbidden, for it might assist in charitable 
acts, but the true sage, Pallas concludes, will hold wealth in contempt.  
 
	
55 See e.g. De exilio 91-2, quoting the Diogenis quae feruntur epistulae 13 and 26, which can be found 
in Gabriele Giannantoni, Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae, 4 vols (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1990), §§ 
V B 543 and 556. Later, at 1.106-8, Filelfo also draws on the letters of Apollonius of Tyana for similar 
sentiments.  
56 De exilio 1.97: Virtus ipsa satis per sese ad felicitatem munita est. Satis armata adversus omnem 
fortunae impetum atque naufragium. Nullius opis indiget, nullius subsidii.  
57 See De exilio 1.97-103 for the question and the response.  
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In all this, Filelfo may well have been deliberately setting the note a little too high, 
following the example of Diogenes himself, in order to counter-balance the 
ubiquitous obsession with material wealth.58 He may not have seriously expected 
readers to embrace such an extreme view. Indeed, as the dialogue progresses, 
Palla shifts to a more moderate position. The sage, he suggests, will not be 
completely indifferent to their circumstances after all. They might quite 
reasonably hope for better days during hard times – such as periods of exile – 
while remaining untroubled by present difficulties.59 This view is closer to the 
Stoic position of welcoming some external goods as things ‘preferred’ 
(προηγµένα), while continuing to insist that they are not necessary for a good life.  
 
At this point in the dialogue Poggio Bracciolini joins the discussion. Filelfo 
presents Poggio as an unashamed hedonist, arguing that all pleasures of the soul 
originate in pleasures of the body.60 Poggio aligns himself not with the moderate 
Epicurus but with the more extreme Cyrenaics, insisting that the mind is well 
only when the body is well (animus recte habet cum corpus recte habet). He rejects 
philosophy as a therapeutic or consolatory enterprise. If philosophy claims to 
take care of the soul, it is of little value, for all one needs to do is to attend to the 
needs of the body. The more food and wine the better!61 As we have already seen, 
the real Poggio was far more sympathetic towards the idea of philosophical 
consolation. Here he is made to stand in as the philosophical representative of 
	
58 See Diogenes Laertius 6.35.  
59 See De exilio 1.136.  
60 See De exilio 1.142-4.  
61 See De exilio 1.153. This brings out the Cyrenaic (as opposed to Epicurean) character of Poggio’s 
hedonism.  
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the Medicean circle, and then roundly attacked for reducing humans to little 
more than beasts.  
 
Taken as a whole, the dialogue insists on a stark opposition between a life devoted 
solely to virtue and one concerned with pleasure. Virtue is a property of the soul 
and is within our control, while pleasure belongs to the body and depends upon 
external goods and circumstances, all of which are under the control of Fortune. 
While the former is secure and stable, the latter cannot be predicted from one 
moment to the next. A life devoted to pleasure, then, is one in which one’s 
happiness is placed in the hands of a force out of one’s control. Material wealth is 
not only unnecessary for a good life, but in fact an impediment to it. On this point 
Palla cites an anecdote about the Stoic Zeno of Citium who, when shipwrecked 
and freed of his last remaining possessions, exclaimed “Well done, Fortune, you 
who have forced us to the rough cloak and the philosopher’s life!”62  
 
This distinctively Cynic-Stoic line of argument continues as Palla moves on to the 
most important part of his philosophical consolation for exile. He notes that 
many of the greatest philosophers lived in places far from where they were born, 
and yet were not wretched for it.63 Socrates had famously proclaimed that he was 
not a citizen of any particular city but instead a citizen of the whole world.64 This 
Socratic-Cynic definition of cosmopolitanism is better, Palla suggests, than the 
	
62 De exilio 1.178: Bene facis, o fortuna, quae nos ad pallium vitamque philosophi compulisti. Here 
Filelfo is drawing on Plutarch, e.g. Tranq. 467d.  
63 See De exilio 1.184. On the cosmopolitanism in De exilio, see W. Scott Blanchard, “Patrician Sages 
and the Humanist Cynic: Francesco Filelfo and the Ethics of World Citizenship,” Renaissance 
Quarterly 60 (2007): 1107-69.  
64 See De exilio 1.186, with Cicero, Tusc. 5.108, noted above.  
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Stoic definition found in Seneca of a community embracing both God and man.65 
The reason for this is because the world in which people live does not involve 
community with God, something reserved for the next life. Instead it is more akin 
to a prison created by God. The soul is imprisoned within the body, which is, in 
turn, part of the material prison that is the whole world.66 There are thus two 
arguments against excessive attachment to one’s homeland or city of birth. The 
first, drawing on the Cynic-Stoic tradition, is that one’s immediate surroundings 
ought to be of no concern, for a wise person will be at home anywhere in the 
world. The second, turning to Platonic and Christian themes, is that, in any case, 
the whole world is merely a temporary prison and not one’s true home at all. Thus 
two quite different lines of argument are brought to bear on Onofrio’s concern 
that exile is a great misfortune. Palla sums up by saying “For our friendliest 
homeland is not Florence, not Tuscany, not Italy, not Europe, not the whole earth, 
not this entire sublunary world, but heaven”.67 The person exiled from their city 
of birth should not look backwards to a return to the contingent place where they 
happened to have been born, but rather forwards to their escape from the 
material prison of this world.  
 
Towards the end of Book 1 of the dialogue Palla sums up what he takes to be the 
correct attitude towards Fortune. In terms highly reminiscent of the Stoic 
Epictetus – although there is no evidence to suggest that this was Filelfo’s source 
– he writes:  
	
65 See De exilio 1.186, with e.g. Cicero, Leg. 1.23 and Seneca, De otio 4.1.  
66 See De exilio 1.190.  
67 De exilio 1.191: Nam nostra nobis amicissima patria caelum est, non Florentia, non Tuscia, non 
Italia, non Europa, non totus denique terrarum orbis, non mundus hic universus inferior. In the next 
line Palla quotes from Plato in support of this view.  
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One must accept whatever has happened to us or what is happening, 
as if it befalls us according to our wishes. For people are troubled not 
at what they do in accord with their free will, but what they do 
against their will. It is not fair for them to gain whatever they wish, 
but all things that come about by necessity are to be wished.68  
 
Thus the wise person will embrace whatever Fortune brings, because “to resist 
necessity is to be an arrogant madman”.69 Filelfo’s discussion is especially rich, 
engaging with a wide range of ancient philosophical positions and a number of 
different forms of consolatory argument, from reflections on value ascription to 
the futility of trying to fight against necessity.  
 
6. Bartolomeo Scala  
 
In 1463 Bartolomeo Scala – soon to become Chancellor of Florence – wrote a 
dialogue of consolation addressed to Lorenzo de’ Medici in response to the death 
of his uncle, Giovanni de’ Medici.70 The dialogue purports to be a discussion 
	
68 De exilio 1.237: Quidquid acciderit nobis, aut etiam accidat, ita est accipiendum quasi ex sententia 
contingat. Non enim quae pro libera voluntate, sed quae invite homines faciunt, graviter ferunt. Nec 
quaecunque cupiunt ut ea contingant, par est, sed omnia quae necessitate proveniunt cupienda sunt. 
Compare this with Epictetus, Ench. 5 and 8.  
69 De exilio 1.238: Necessitati autem repugnare et insolentis est et insani.  
70 Scala’s Dialogus de consolatione is edited in Bartolomeo Scala, Humanistic and Political Writings, 
ed. Alison Brown (Tempe, AZ: Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1997), 274-300, and 
reprinted with a facing translation in Bartolomeo Scala, Essays and Dialogues, trans. Renée Neu 
Watkins (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 68-141. I cite the text according to the 
section numbers printed in the margins of the latter. For a study of Scala’s life and works, see 
Alison Brown, Bartolomeo Scala 1430-1497, Chancellor of Florence: The Humanist and Bureaucrat 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), which touches on the dialogue at 36-7 and 268-9. 
See also McClure, Sorrow and Consolation, 135-9.  
	 23 
between Scala and Cosimo de’ Medici, Giovanni’s father. One might expect to 
find Scala offering consolation to Cosimo for the loss of his son, but in fact it is 
Cosimo who dominates proceedings, offering a range of arguments designed to 
show that neither death nor wider vicissitudes of fortune are to be feared. The 
discussion is surprisingly complex, containing a number of twists and hinting at 
a wide range of philosophical precedents. All this is put into the mouth of Cosimo 
and it is, of course, difficult to know how much of this is Scala’s literary fiction 
and how much it might reflect the historical Cosimo’s own views. As McClure 
notes, Cosimo was still alive at the time of the dialogue’s composition, and Scala 
may even have intended Cosmio to see it, in which case one might expect the 
ideas presented by Cosimo in the dialogue to reflect at least the spirit of the 
historical Cosimo’s views.71 Whether they do or not, the discussion is a rich 
example of philosophical consolation, alluding to a wide range of ancient 
philosophical positions.  
 
Although, as we have said, the dialogue was presented to Lorenzo de’ Medici, 
Scala opens the text by stating that his motivation was to offer consolation to 
himself. The process of writing would have itself functioned as a spiritual exercise 
for Scala, helping him to keep in check his own sorrow, as well as offering 
consolation for others who might read it later. He begins by insisting that sorrow 
is a natural human response to the loss of a loved one and he doubts whether any 
kind of philosophical consolation could alleviate this quite natural reaction. One 
of his reasons for engaging Cosimo in discussion is the equanimity he managed 
to display in the face of such a loss, “even beyond ordinary human nature”.72 
	
71 See McClure, Sorrow and Consolation, 136.  
72 Scala, Dialogus de consolatione 3: Quem cum viderem praeter omnium opinionem praeterque 
mortalium naturam tam aequo ferre animo tantam calamitatem.  
	 24 
Indeed, it is the topic of human nature that guides the subsequent discussion, for 
any kind of philosophical consolation must be grounded on a proper 
understanding of what it is to be human.  
 
Closely connected to this is the role of Fortune in human happiness. Cosimo 
opens his remarks on this by reflecting that while his life has been blessed with 
immense good fortune in many ways, he has been all too conscious that bad 
fortune must never be far away. The more fortunate he was, the more anxious he 
became that bad fortune might strike at any moment, imagining “all the time that 
some great evil was bound to strike me”.73 The loss of his son is simply an instance 
of the bad fortune he has been expecting all along. Cosimo’s opening position, 
then, is that bad fortune and its accompanying sorrow is simply part of human 
life. However, he quickly offers the possibility of an alternative view:  
 
Surely either we are totally blind and do not see what is good in life, 
or life is indeed terribly hard, exposing us to floods and storms and 
never offering solid ground where we might find some safety.74  
 
Cosimo will go on to argue that we are indeed blind to what is good in life, as well 
as to the truth about human nature, and so the adversity that comes with bad 
fortune is, in fact, only apparent, and not real. Scala nudges Cosimo in this 
direction by reminding him that he has always been committed to the view that 
happiness is dependent on himself and not anything external, initiating a 
	
73 Dialogus de consolatione 13: magni continuo mihi aliquid mali impendere cogitabam.  
74 Ibid.: Profecto aut caeci omnino sumus nec quid bonum in vita sit videmus, aut certe misera 
admodum hominum vita est, quae tot fluctibus procellisque iactetur nec stationem unquam in qua 
vel paululum modo conquiescat nanciscatur.  
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discussion of the relationship between fortune, happiness, and virtue. Does the 
possession of virtue guarantee happiness? Or can fortune triumph over virtue? 
Why go through the hard work of cultivating virtue if it can so easily be 
undermined by fortune? Implicit here is the view that virtue is something 
pursued for the sake of happiness, rather than for its own sake, for the point is not 
that fortune can in some way impede virtuous action, but rather that it can 
undermine virtue’s claim to guarantee a happy or blessed life.75 Despite being told 
that Cosimo holds that happiness is indeed dependent on oneself, he 
nevertheless distances himself from Scala’s professed Stoicism. According to 
Cosimo, the Stoics place too much stress on virtue, forgetting the role of the body. 
When the body is suffering, the mind is unable to maintain complete control.76 
Moreover, there are other things beyond virtue that are good by nature and that 
contribute to a good and happy life.77 In other words, Cosimo rejects the Stoic 
view that virtue alone is sufficient for happiness, instead adopting the Peripatetic 
view that some external goods both have inherent value and contribute to the 
quality of one’s life. He acknowledges that pain is not an evil – explicitly rejecting 
the Epicurean view – while at the same time wanting to resist the popular image 
of the Stoic as someone who feels nothing when facing physical suffering.78 The 
Peripatetic tenor continues when he adds that while it is unrealistic to escape the 
passions altogether, one should nevertheless try to moderate them.79  
 
	
75 Dialogus de consolatione 17.  
76 Dialogus de consolatione 18.  
77 Dialogus de consolatione 22-3.  
78 Dialogus de consolatione 24-5. Cosimo goes on to argue that it is impossible for the Epicureans 
to offer any kind of consolation, given that they hold that pain is indeed a genuine evil.  
79 Dialogus de consolatione 27.  
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Scala responds by claiming that he is so impressed by Cosimo’s arguments that 
he is prepared to renounce his own Stoicism. The Stoic sage, Scala says, is a 
superhuman, and so unrealistic, ideal. The reason why Stoicism cannot offer any 
real consolation is because of its mistaken view of human nature.80 Cosimo takes 
up this idea, namely that any real consolation must be grounded in a proper 
understanding of human nature. The truth, he says, is that people are all 
unhappy.81 They think that wealth, honours, and health are good things when, in 
fact, they may be better off pursuing their opposites. What people usually take to 
be goods may in fact harm them, while what they think is bad fortune may 
actually benefit them. People pursue great wealth, when in fact it leads to self-
indulgent pleasure, laziness, and the envy of others. Cosimo, one of the wealthiest 
men then alive, says “without hesitation I would dare to affirm that poverty is 
better for anyone than riches”.82 This reversal of usual notions of good and bad 
fortune echoes the central theme of Seneca’s De providentia, which might suggest 
a residual Stoic element; subsequent quotations from Lucretius have led some to 
suggest an Epicurean aspect.83 As we shall see, neither is the case.  
 
The next step in Cosimo’s argument is to distinguish between three types of 
goods: those of the body, those of the soul, and external goods.84 People who 
pursue external goods, such as wealth and honours, make their happiness 
dependent upon fortune. While they pursue the favours of fortune, “fortune often 
	
80 Dialogus de consolatione 29-30.  
81 Dialogus de consolatione 31: sed re vera miseri omnes sumus.  
82 Dialogus de consolatione 32: ut sine dubitatione aliquia audeam affirmare quibusque paupertatem 
divitiis anteferendam esse. 
83 See e.g. Alison Brown, in Bartolomeo Scala, Essays and Dialogues, ix.  
84 Dialogus de consolatione 35.  
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disdains them and rages against them, and they quickly come to realize how far 
they have strayed from the truth”.85 The external goods that fortune offers are 
never worth pursuing, while the lust they generate is “the very greatest source of 
human misery”.86 People think these external goods are necessary for happiness 
when in fact, because they are controlled by fortune, their pursuit makes one’s 
happiness profoundly insecure. Thus Cosimo concludes that external goods are 
unnecessary for human happiness.  
 
This looks like a move away from his earlier Peripatetic view and Scala responds 
by noting that Cosimo seems to be embracing the Stoic view that he earlier 
rejected.87 Both agree that the only true goods are those of the soul, but then 
Cosimo shifts direction somewhat. Philosophy, he says, is, as Plato said, a 
meditation on death, and the truly wise prefer death to life.88 This reference to the 
Phaedo sets the theme for the remainder of the discussion. So long as the soul is 
joined to the body it will only ever encounter a “shadow of a true and real good”.89 
Death is, he argues, the only refuge from the evils of human life, and it is in fact 
not an evil at all. This clearly Platonic position is augmented with references to 
Scripture, presenting Cosimo as a Christian Platonist, very much in line with his 
great protégé Marsilio Ficino.  
 
	
85 Dialogus de consolatione 36: saepe superbiente ac saeviente fortuna, quatum ab vero aberrarint 
facile recognoscant.  
86 Dialogus de consolatione 39: ista vel maxima hominum miseria.  
87 Dialogus de consolatione 40.  
88 Dialogus de consolatione 42: tamen ea tandem vera philosophia est, ut Platoni quoque placet, quae 
mortis habet commentationem.  
89 Ibid.: umbram quandam veri solidique boni.  
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When Scala responds by again deferentially agreeing with Cosimo and then 
lamenting about the inevitable sorrow of the human condition, Cosimo chides 
him for impiety. To describe the human condition as inevitably miserable is to 
find fault with God. The suffering that people go through is the product of their 
pursuing external goods. That the pursuit of these goods inevitably leads to 
suffering and offers only insecure happiness subject to the whims of fortune is 
itself a lesson that these are in fact false goods. Instead one ought to turn away 
from external goods and those of the body to focus on the soul, in preparation for 
the next life. Continuing the Platonic imagery, Cosimo says “we live amid shadow 
and smoke, and following our spiritual nature, we seek something stable”.90 
 
Cosimo’s final position in the dialogue is that there is no consolation for human 
suffering, for this is simply part of the human condition. However, this is not 
something to be lamented, for it is a deliberate divine reminder that one ought 
not to focus one’s attention on the body or on external goods that fortune can 
give and take as it pleases. Despite this, Cosimo can still offer consolation for the 
suffering at hand, namely the loss of his son, Giovanni. Death is no evil, just as it 
was not for Socrates in the Phaedo. When Crito wept over Socrates’ corpse it 
simply showed that he had failed to grasp Socrates’ arguments about the true 
nature of the human being, namely that the real Socrates was an immortal soul. 
Philosophical consolation for death requires a proper understanding of the 
nature of human beings, just as one can see played out in the Phaedo. Cosimo’s 
line of argument is very much in that Platonic tradition. It shares with Stoicism a 
rejection of the importance of external goods, and so avoids dependence on 
	
90 Dialogus de consolatione 49: Ita vero fit in umbra et fumo nos esse intelligentes, dum secuti animi 
naturam, aliquid stabile conquirimus. 
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fortune, but unlike Stoicism it embraces physical suffering as a constant reminder 
that the soul will be happier once it has departed the body. Giovanni’s death was 
thus in no way a bad thing.  
 
Scala’s text draws on philosophical discussions about value, the relationship 
between body and soul, and the wider metaphysics that these presuppose, all in 
order to develop his own attempt at philosophical consolation. The Platonic 
themes in his discussion mark a move away from the consolatory tradition of the 
earlier Humanists who, as we have seen, drew inspiration primarily from Cicero 
and Seneca.  
 
7. Marsilio Ficino  
 
It is difficult to know for sure to what extent, if any, the views of Scala’s ‘Cosimo’ 
overlapped with the outlook of the real Cosimo de’ Medici. The broadly Platonist 
view attributed to him is certainly plausible, and no doubt the real Cosimo 
discussed similar material with his close associate Marsilio Ficino. Ficino was, of 
course, a prolific author and translator, producing commentaries on both Plato’s 
dialogues and other works from the late ancient Platonic tradition, as well as his 
major work, the Theologia Platonica. He was also a great letter writer and, 
following Petrarch and other Humanists, organized and edited his 
	 30 
correspondence for publication.91 It is among his letters that we find a number of 
texts offering consolation or discussing consolatory themes.92  
 
Around a decade after the composition of Scala’s dialogue, Ficino wrote a letter 
of consolation to Gismondo della Stufa, whose fiancé had died the day before 
their planned wedding.93 Like Scala, the consolation Ficino offered was resolutely 
Platonic: the soul is the real person, not the body, which is a mere shadow.94 By 
withdrawing into one’s soul it is possible to possess the soul of another, via an act 
of contemplation of the idea of the person, and this idea-soul is far more beautiful 
than the transient physical form that has just been lost.  
 
Elsewhere he reflects more widely on coping with bad fortune, again drawing 
heavily on Platonism.95 A human is composed of a soul and a body. While the soul 
is in kinship with God, the body is part of the material universe. While the former 
is guided by providence, the latter is subject to fate. The soul is thus free from the 
vicissitudes of fate, or at least has the potential to be, so long as it does not become 
too strongly tied to the body. The way to escape the violence of fate, then, is to 
withdraw from the body and focus on the life of the mind, “for then fate will 
	
91 His letters can be found in Marsilio Ficino, Opera, 2 vols (Basel: Heinrich Petri, 1561), 1:607-964. 
There is an incomplete critical edition in Marsilio Ficino, Lettere, ed. Sebastiano Gentile, 2 vols 
(Florence: Olschki, 1990-2010). Eleven books (of twelve) have been translated into English in The 
Letters of Marsilio Ficino, 11 vols (London: Shepheard-Walwyn, 1975-2020); this is based upon the 
editio princeps – Epistolae (Venice: Matteo Capcasa, for Hieronymous Blondus, 1495) – and a 
number of manuscripts, incorporating corrections and alternative readings. The letters are 
unnumbered in the Opera; I follow the numbering in the translation.  
92 These include Ficino, Ep. 1.15, 1.20, 1.50, 1.112, 3.61, 4.33, 5.46, 8.42, 8.49, 9.2, 10.29, 11.31, and 11.32.  
93 This is Ficino, Ep. 1.15 (Opera 1:617), dated 1st August 1473. In Lettere 1:38 it is numbered 1.14.  
94 See Ficino, Ep. 1.15 (Opera 1:617; Lettere 1:38): certe animus homo ipse est; corpus autem est hominis 
umbra.  
95 See Ficino, Ep. 1.50 (Opera 1:633; Lettere 1:97-8).  
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discharge its force upon the body without touching the soul”.96 His argument is 
not that bad fortune is not really evil at all; instead he acknowledges it as evil, 
counselling that one ought to run away from it by retreating into the soul. Strictly 
speaking this cannot be Ficino’s view and he is probably using the word ‘evil’ in 
its common meaning rather than a more technical sense, perhaps in deference to 
his correspondent.97 For Ficino qua Neoplatonist, evil is nothing at all, an absence 
of being.98 The notion that external misfortunes are genuine evils is the view of 
those who have not yet extricated their souls from the material world, but it 
serves the purpose of Ficino’s argument to continue to describe such things as 
evil if that can act as a spur to encourage withdrawal into the soul.  
 
In a letter to Bernardo Bembo (father of Pietro), Ficino pursues this further, 
tackling head on the value of fortune.99 It often seems, he notes, that fortune 
attacks good people and rewards the bad. The vicious appear to be rewarded with 
worldly success, while the virtuous seem, for all intents and purposes, to get 
punished. But in fact, Ficino argues, the opposite is the case. The vicious person 
raised up by fortune remains vicious and, unable to learn a moral lesson in such 
circumstances, suffers the real harm of remaining vicious. The virtuous who 
suffer at the hands of fortune benefit from the constant reminder that external 
circumstances are of no consequence at all, and so the primacy of virtue is 
	
96 Ficino, Ep. 1.50 (Opera, 1:633; Lettere 1:98): tunc enim vim suam fortuna explebit in corpore, in 
animum non transibit.  
97 See Paul Oskar Kristeller, The Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino, trans. Virginia Conant (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1943), 352-3.  
98 Ficino outlines his philosophical account of evil in his commentary on the De divinis nominibus 
of Pseudo-Dionysius, esp. § 134. Note the edition with translation in Marsilio Ficino, On Dionysius 
the Areopagite, ed. and trans. Michael J. B. Allen, 2 vols (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2015). See further Kristeller, The Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino, 64-5.  
99 This is Ep. 3.61 (Opera 1:748).  
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reinforced. Thus, “for the evil, good fortune becomes evil; but for the good, evil 
fortune becomes good”.100 People can be governed by either chance or wisdom. 
The person who values external goods will inevitably be at the whim of chance 
fortune, but the person who values wisdom above all else will be impervious to 
such ups and downs: “No one is more pitiable than he who places true happiness 
in fortune. No one is happier than he who does not judge fortuitous prosperity 
truly to be happiness.”101 Although Ficino does not explicitly make the connection 
in this letter, it is fairly clear the way in which this contrast between chance 
fortune and constant wisdom maps onto his distinction between the world of 
material bodies and the realm of the soul.102  
 
Two letters from the 1490s make explicit that it is philosophy that is the antidote 
to fortune.103 The life of the philosopher is all too often marked by poverty – “no 
philosophers will ever be rich and rich men cannot easily become philosophers” 
– but this is of no concern to someone who places value in virtue rather than 
external circumstances.104 Similarly, according to Aristotle intelligence and good 
fortune often seem to be mutually exclusive, and the philosopher is happy to 
	
100 Ficino, Ep. 3.61 (Opera 1:748): Malis quidem bona fortuna fit mala, bonis autem mala fortuna 
bona. See also Ep. 4.33 (Opera 1:778): “Fortune can neither benefit the wicked nor harm the good” 
(Fortuna neque benefacere potest malis neque malefacere bonis).  
101 Ficino, Ep. 3.61 (Opera 1:748-9): Nemo miserior illo qui veram felicitatem collocat in fortuna. Nemo 
felicior quam qui fortuitam prosperitatem revera felicem esse non iudicat.  
102 Elsewhere, Ep. 10.29 (Opera 1:913-14), Ficino gives a more formal definition of fortune, stating 
that it ought to be identified with fate, which is a succession of celestial causes (Quae quidem cum 
fato, id est, cum serie coelestium causarum).  
103 These are Ep. 11.31 and 32 (Opera 1:943-4).  
104 See Ep. 11.31 (Opera 1:943): neque Philosophos ullos unquam fore divites, neque rursum divites 
facile fore Philosophos. 
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embrace intelligence at the expense of good fortune.105 In short, then, the way to 
escape the vicissitudes of fortune is to embrace a philosophical way of life, 
focused on the cultivation of wisdom and taking care of one’s soul. On such a life, 
fortune can leave no mark.  
 
Here we can see the way in which the philosophical position underpinning a 
particular consolatory argument can lead to specific recommendations about 
how to live. Ficino’s broadly Platonic-Aristotelian tone suggests a life of 
withdrawal focused on intellectual contemplation, something quite different 
from the Stoic and Cynic responses embraced by some of the other Renaissance 
thinkers considered earlier.   
 
8. Conclusions  
 
As we have seen, a number of Humanists produced works of philosophical 
consolation drawing on arguments from a variety of ancient philosophers in 
order to offer practical remedies for people suffering in the face of bereavement, 
exile, and other misfortunes brought by fate and fortune. Different ancient 
philosophical positions made different claims about the nature of human beings, 
their place in nature, and what has value, leading them to offer different remedies 
for misfortune. Stoic, Cynic, Platonic, and Aristotelian strategies were all 
discussed and indeed defended in Renaissance works of consolation. Questions 
about which type of consolation might be best involved reflection on both which 
underpinning arguments seemed most convincing and which offered genuine 
	
105 See Ep. 11.32 (Opera 1:943), where Ficino cites the Aristotelian Magna moralia 1207a4-6, which 
is probably not by Aristotle himself.  
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solace in times of distress. As we saw in the case of Salutati, sometimes a position 
that was much admired in the abstract failed to offer any comfort when put to the 
test in real life.  
 
It should come as no great surprise that Renaissance Humanists became so 
interested in philosophical consolation, given the ancient texts that they were 
reading. Not withstanding the rediscovery of previously lost texts in both Greek 
and Latin, the already well-known philosophical works of Cicero and Seneca 
remained key points of reference for Humanist thinkers, not least Cicero’s 
Tusculanae disputationes. There, Cicero defined philosophy as a medicine for the 
soul,106 mapping out a common therapeutic project shared by the majority of 
ancient philosophers who came after Socrates. It was Socrates who had defined 
philosophy as a task concerned with taking care of the soul.107 Petrarch took up 
this conception of philosophy as an alternative to the Scholastic model,108 setting 
the agenda for subsequent Humanists during the Quattrocento. That Socratic 
model also stood behind the Platonic approach taken up by Scala and Ficino. Its 
image of philosophy as a medicine for the soul and a guide to life was thus always 
in the background. All the Renaissance thinkers considered here were effectively 
committed to the view that philosophy was able to offer genuine consolation for 
people facing adversity. The philosophical solutions offered often proposed 
dramatic changes to an individual’s way of life, whether that be giving up 
allegiance to one’s hometown, rejecting the importance of material possessions, 
reining in ambition, neglecting the demands of the body, or withdrawing into a 
	
106 Cicero, Tusc. 3.1.  
107 Plato, Ap. 29d-e, 30a-b.  
108 See Petrarch’s De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia 107-8, in Francesco Petrarch, Invectives, ed. 
and trans. David Marsh (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003).  
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life of contemplation. Different philosophies championed different ways of life. 
In the Renaissance, many thinkers embraced this idea of philosophy as a way of 
life and their interest in the consolatory power of philosophy was but one 
expression of a wider commitment to the idea that philosophy was a practical 




109 For further discussion of this final thought, see John Sellars, “Renaissance Humanism and 
Philosophy as a Way of Life,” Metaphilosophy 51/2-3 (2020): 226-43.  
